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EXPENDITURE STREAMS AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT IN KENTUCKY: 
DOES MONEY MATTER? 
 
 
Every Kentucky public school is expected to achieve the goal of proficiency on 
the States Accountability Index by the year 2014.  Many schools may not reach the 
proficiency goal in time without a broad, multifaceted approach to enhance educational 
outcomes.  A strategy to optimize the allocation of school district funds may contribute to 
this goal.  Previous studies have attempted to answer the question does money matter? 
for raising school performance, but to date the findings have proven inconsistent.  One 
reason for this might be that most of these studies have used a global measure of 
monetary resources, such as total per pupil expenditure.  The present study explores the 
possibility that expenditures earmarked for different purposestermed expenditure 
streamsmay reveal that financial allocations can make a difference.   
Unfortunately, the present study fails to find a single expenditure stream that is 
directly associated with the mean annual gain in school accountability scores.  Three 
expenditure streams are shown to have indirect effects when mediated by pupil-teacher 
ratio.  Expenditures for instruction and instructional staff support show positive indirect 
effects, whereas central office support reveals a negative indirect effect.  Although these 
indirect effects are statistically significant, none are large enough to warrant policy 
recommendations.   
The findings indicate that school districts are unlikely to stimulate school 





categories.  A possible explanation for this disappointing conclusion is that the linkage 
between personnel costs, which comprise 75-80 percent of all expenditures, and 
personnel quality is very weakly established at the present time.  Efforts to more 
effectively measure personnel quality and to establish salary rates commensurate with 
quality might possibly lead to more robust associations between spending and school 
performance.  Yet, one cannot place confidence in this solution at the present time since 
it has not been established by research that endogenous resources, such as high quality 
personnel, are the primary requisites for school improvement.  Exogenous circumstances, 
such as the characteristics of the local community in which the school is embedded and 
the families whose children attend the school, along with school-community and school-
family relations, may greatly influence how rapidly schools improve. 
The answer to the does money matter? question remains moot for Kentucky as 
it does for the nation at large.  The collection of school-level, rather than district-level, 
expenditure data might allow greater specificity in the definition of expenditure streams.  
More research to discover robust links between specific expenditure streams and school 





EXPENDITURE STREAMS AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT IN KENTUCKY:  
DOES MONEY MATTER?1 
  
Since the passage of the Kentucky Educational Reform Act of 1990 (KERA), 
Kentucky public schools have been under intense scrutiny.  All public schools are 
enjoined to reach proficiency (100 out of 140 possible points) on the states 
Accountability Index by the year 2014.  The Accountability Index score of each school is 
calculated annually from a battery of academic tests and non-cognitive measures that 
denote student and school performance.  At this point, thirteen years into the reform era, 
only six of the states more than 1,200 schools have reached the goal.  With eleven more 
years to go, it is apparent that many schools will not reach the proficiency standard 
without a broad, multifaceted approach for enhancing educational outcomes (Reeves, 
2003; Roeder, 2001).  Kentucky educators and policymakers face a daunting task. 
   Most educators and many policymakers assume a link exists between 
educational spending and educational excellence, but empirical research backing up this 
assumption has been inconclusive.  How expenditures affect student learning and the 
excellence of schools is a hoary, unresolved problem in educational research.  The 
present study plunges into the fray, asking how expenditures may influence school 
accountability scores in Kentucky.  Confirming a linkage between finance and school  
                                                 
1The research results contained in this study were first presented as a Power Point slide show at a 
November 2001 meeting of the Educational Research Roundtable, Office of Educational Accountability, in 
Frankfort, KY.  Subsequently, different versions of this paper were presented at the annual meeting of the 
Mid-South Educational Research Association held in Chattanooga, TN in November 2002 and at the 
Sociology of Education Roundtable Session during the annual meeting of the American Sociological 
Association held in Atlanta, GA in August 2003.  The present version of the paper has benefited from the 
feedback received at each of these venues.  Debbie Abell and Dave Rudy also contributed by reading and 





improvement would be of great value to Kentucky policymakers, as it would suggest a 
way to harness the education finance system to the purposes of KERA (cf. Ladd & 
Hansen, 1999). 
Background 
 The presumed linkage between school finance and student achievement received 
its first major empirical challenge in mid-1960.  Equality of Educational Opportunity 
(Coleman et al., 1966), also known as the Coleman Report, found that school resources 
(expenditures and facilities) explained less than five percent of the variance in student 
achievement.  Numerous studies followed attempting to confirm or to refute this finding.  
Hanushek (1989) gathered together school finance studies from 1967 to 1986, performed 
a meta analysis, and concluded that the preponderance of the evidence did not support the 
linkage between educational spending and performance.  Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald 
(1994) followed with a fresh meta analysis that disputed Hanusheks conclusion.  They 
found that school resources are systematically related to student achievement and these 
relations are large enough to be educationally important.  Hanushek (1997) responded 
with an update and expansion of his original meta analysis.  Once again he found little 
relation between achievement and expenditure.   
To date, attempts to resolve the issue of does money matter? have not reached a 
satisfactory conclusion.  All of the studies on which the various meta analyses were 
performed used a global measure of expenditure, such as total per pupil expenditure, and 
a production function methodology that sought a direct relationship between expenditure 
and achievement.  Recent studies depart from this pattern.  For instance, Wenglinsky 





conclusions finds that expenditures influence achievement because they increase or 
reduce the pupil-teacher ratio.  A RAND study (Grissmer et al., 2000), examining state-
to-state improvement in NAEP test scores, finds additional support for this perspective.  
Lowering the pupil-teacher ratio significantly increases achievement, while raising 
teacher salaries did not, according to this study.  A third study, conducted by the 
Southwest Educational Development Laboratory (Pan et al., 2003), observes that high 
performing school districts employ more teachers and spend more on instruction than low 
performing districts.  High performing districts also tend to spend less on general 
administration and non-instructional services. 
 Despite the inconclusiveness of the research findings, state policymakers and 
citizens have taken inequities in school funding very seriously.  The constitutionality of 
unequal funding has been challenged in one state after another, across the nation.  In 
Kentucky, the impetus for KERA was a class action suit that sought redress for school 
finance inequities.  A recent study by independent consultants (Picus, Odden, & 
Fermanich, 2001) has shown that substantial progress has been made since the advent of 
KERA to equalize per pupil funding across the state.  But equal funding may not 
contribute to raising the performance of all students and schools for two primary reasons:  
First, as many educational researchers have concluded, school finance may not be the real 
issue.  Gamoran (2001), for example, commenting on the trend in many states to equalize 
school funding, asserts: 
This trendwill do little to reduce the major advantages held by those [students] 
from families with more economic resources over those with less.  The most 
important resources tend to operate at the individual level, so they are unaffected 






The second reason why the equalization of funding may not elevate school performance 
is that the allocation of funds for different purposes may be more important than the total 
funds available.  In other words, enhancing school performance may depend on how 
wisely school districts distribute the financial resources that they control.  The present 
study engages this issue by investigating the effects of expenditure streams (funds 
allocated for different purposes) on school accountability score gains in Kentucky.     
The Present Study 
 This study seeks answers for the following questions: 
1. What are the effects of various expenditures streams on the mean annual gain in 
Kentucky Accountability Index scores? 
2. Are these effects direct, indirect, or both? 
3. What are the policy implications of the findings? 
Method 
The statistical procedure chosen for this study was repeated-observations 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, pp. 162-3).  This 
procedure analyzes the effects of expenditure streams on within-school accountability 
score gains, controlling for school and district characteristics.  A three-level model to 
estimate the Accountability Index score (Y) was specified with the following equations:   
Level 1 (within-school) 
 
Y = π0 + π1(year index) + e 
 
Level 2 (between-school) 
 
 π0 = β00 + β01(school membership) + β02(middle school) + β03(high school)  
+ β04(combined school) + β05(pupil-teacher ratio) + β06(% Black students)  






 π1 = β10 + β11(school membership) + β12(middle school) + β13(high school)  
+ β14(combined school) + β15(pupil-teacher ratio) + β16(% Black students)  
+ β17(% subsidized lunch) + r1 
 
Level 3 (between-district) 
 
 β00 = γ000 + γ001(district membership) + γ002(located inside an MSA) 
  + γ003(per capita income) + γ004(instruction) + γ005(instructional support) 
  + γ006(instructional staff support) + γ007(district administration) 
  + γ008(school administration) + γ009(central office support) + u00 
 
β10 = γ100 + γ101(district membership) + γ102(located inside an MSA) 
  + γ103(per capita income) + γ104(instruction) + γ105(instructional support) 
  + γ106(instructional staff support) + γ107(district administration) 
  + γ108(school administration) + γ109(central office support) + u10 
 
Level 1 comprises four years (19992002) of Kentucky Accountability Index (AI) 
scores for each school in the sample.  In the equation above, π0 represents the baseline 
(1999) AI score, and π1 represents the mean annual gain achieved between 1999 and 
2002.  The Level-2 data consist of features that differentiate the sample of 1,111 of 
Kentuckys more than 1,200 public schools.  Level 3, comprising 170 of Kentuckys 176 
school districts, encompasses features that differentiate the school districts, including the 
expenditure streams for instruction, instructional support, instructional staff support, 
district administration, school administration, and central office support. 
Variables 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables.  Each year of 
Accountability Index data has been entered as a separate record.  Consequently, in the 
Level-1 equation there are 4,444 casesfour observations for each of the 1,111 schools.  
The record of each case is denoted by a year index (0, representing 1999, through 3, 
representing 2002).  The range of AI scores is substantial (more than 70 points).  More 







Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Variable            Mean    Std. Dev.    Min.            Max. 
Level 1 (Within-school, N1 = 4444)     
Accountability Index (AI score)   67.90        10.30   35.90         108.60 
Year (index)       1.50          1.12       0               3 
Level 2 (Between-school, N2 = 1111): 
% students eligible for subsidized lunch        51.26         21.59     0.67           99.06 
% Black students                   8.88         13.83             0.00            72.99 
School membership                      515.02       294.35           65.00        2052.00 
Pupil/teacher ratio                20.43           5.20     9.40           42.10 
School type: 
 Elementary (reference category)                0.56           0.50        0                  1 
 Middle       0.17           0.38        0   1 
 High       0.17           0.38        0   1 
 Combined      0.10           0.29        0   1 
Level 3 (Between-district, N3 = 170): 
District membership             3763.31     7865.90           195.00     95815.00 
Located inside an MSA      0.25           0.44         0    1 
Per capita income ($)          16253.22        5054.15         9716.00     63375.00 
Per pupil expenditure streams ($): 
Instruction            3182.27       359.33        2271.57       4635.24 
Instructional support            180.56         57.17    49.61         388.39 
Instructional staff support           237.37       101.51    28.48         923.82 
District administration                        272.95       159.58    39.14         933.96 
School administration            278.32         66.30  128.93         511.84 






reach proficiency by 2014, an average elementary school will have to increase its 
accountability score by as much as three standard deviations.  In other words, in eleven 
years the average school will be expected to perform at a level currently achieved by less 
than one percent of Kentucky schools.  It is very unlikely that such dramatic progress can 
be accomplished without equally dramatic changes in how educational resources are 
allocated and used.   
At Level 2, the variables that distinguish between schools are:  the percentage of 
students eligible for subsidized lunch,2 the percentage of Black students,3 school 
membership, the pupil-teacher ratio, and a series of dummy variables denoting school 
type.  Each of these variables describes the school during the 1999-2000 school year.  
Before performing the HLM analysis, two variablespercent Black students and school 
membershipwere log transformed to achieve better approximation to a normal 
distribution.  With regard to the multinomial variable of school type, elementary school is 
the reference category.  Combined school refers to schools with grades that span either 
the elementary and middle school grade levels or the middle and high school grade 
levels.   
At Level 3, the variables differentiating the school districts include a log-
transformed measure of district membership and a dummy variable indicating that the 
school district is located inside a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).4   Also at Level 3,  
                                                 
2 To achieve a better fit in the HLM analysis, % subsidized lunch was estimated with random as well as 
fixed effects.  The inclusion of a random effect was needed because the effect of % subsidized lunch on the 
baseline AI score is not only significant across all schools in the sample, but more specifically the effect 
varies significantly among the schools within each district. 
3 Blacks are the only sizeable minority in Kentuckys public schools.  Because of very small counts, other 
racial and ethnic categories are not systematically counted by the Kentucky Department of Education. 
4 The control variables were chosen because they were previously shown to influence Kentucky school 





the different expenditure streams are captured by the per pupil expenditures for 
instruction, instructional support, instructional staff support, district administration, 
school administration, and central office support.  The expenditure stream variables are 
shown in Table 1 as the dollar amounts expended in each category in 1999.  Table 2 
provides details of the major components of each expenditure stream category. 
A final Level-3 variable is a control for the between-district variation in the cost 
of providing educational services.  Following McMahon (1996), a cost of living proxy is 
used for the district-level cost of education.  Initially, two variables that McMahon cited 
as key indicators of intrastate cost of living estimatesper capita income and the median 
value of housingwere considered.  For each Kentucky school district in the sample, the 
per capita income in 1999 and the median value of owner-occupied housing in 2000 were 
acquired from the Census 2000 School District Profiles (National Center for Educational 
Statistics).  In initial testing of the suitability of using both indicators it was discovered 
that median housing value showed strong collinearity with per capita income.  Therefore, 
per capita income alone was chosen as a proxy for the cost of living.  McMahon suggests 
a rationale for this: 
Property is a very narrow and inadequate measure of total family income or 
wealthPer capita personal income is a much better measure of true ability to 
pay, since it reflects the earnings from human capital and interests and profits 
from financial assets, as well as real estate (McMahon, 1996, p. 112). 
 
In Kentucky, per capita income departs strongly from a normal distribution, so this 
variable was also log-transformed before inclusion in the HLM analysis.5 
                                                 
5 McMahon (1996) counseled using a county-level cost of living estimate in preference to a school district-
level estimate.  He did this because his goal was to advise policymakers how best to determine the fair 
allocation of educational funds using intrastate cost adjustments in a funding formula.  His foremost 











Table 2. Expenditure Streams. 
 
 
Expenditure stream Components 
Instruction Teachers salaries & benefits 




Psychological testing & counseling 
Speech pathology & audiology 
Special education related services 
Visually handicapped services 
Instructional staff support services Curriculum development 




Computer assisted instruction 
District administrative support services Board of Education 
Office of Superintendent 
School administrative support services Office of the Principal 
School Council activities 
Central office support services Planning, research, development & evaluation 
Information services 
Personnel services 
Data processing/computer/network services 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
inefficiency and manipulation of the funding formula.  The present study was interested in the more general 






The results of the repeated-observations HLM analysis are shown in Table 3.  The 
first column of regression coefficients contains the fixed effects of the exogenous 
variables on the baseline (1999) Accountability Index score.  These results are not the 
primary concern, although brief mention will be made of them.  The primary concern is 
with the regression coefficients shown in the second column, the fixed effects that 
influence the mean annual change in the AI score.  These are the effects that may 
promote or retard a schools progress toward achieving the 2014 proficiency goal.   
 In the first column of coefficients in Table 3, the intercept reveals that elementary 
schools achieved an average baseline AI score of 65.9, while middle schools, high 
schools, and combined schools achieved significantly less.  Schools in larger districts and 
schools located inside an MSA also performed at significantly lower levels.  Per capita 
income shows a strong positive effect, suggesting that in high-income school districts one 
should expect schools to perform at a very significantly greater level than in low-income 
school districts.  This effect is independent of student poverty in the school per se.  
Student poverty, which is estimated by the percentage of students eligible for subsidized 
lunch, is very significant in the negative direction.  The significantly positive influence of 
the pupil-teacher ratio on the baseline performance is puzzling, but another study (Reeves 
and Bylund, 2003) suggests that it could be the result of an unexamined three-way 
interaction between MSA location, the pupil-teacher ratio, and elementary school.  
Elementary schools are disproportionately found inside MSAs, attain the highest baseline 
performance, and are also the type of school with the largest pupil-teacher ratio (because 











Table 3.  Results of the Repeated-Observations HLM Analysis: The Effects of  
    Expenditure Streams and Other Variables on the Baseline Accountability  
   Index Score and the Mean Annual Gain. 
 
 
Fixed Effect Baseline AI Score Mean Annual Gain 
 Coefficient            SE Coefficient              SE 
Intercept  65.937***       (0.504)  1.888***          (0.095)    
District membership (ln)   -0.871**         (0.667)   0.509***          (0.136) 
Located inside an MSA   -2.146*           (1.091)  -0.114                (0.181) 
Per capita income (ln)  22.525***       (2.298)  -1.200**            (0.446) 
School membership (ln)   -0.874             (0.560)  -0.371*              (0.169) 
Middle school   -3.774***       (0.959)  -0.844***          (0.225) 
High school   -7.974***       (1.070)  -0.746**            (0.275) 
Combined school   -2.931**         (0.813)  -0.389                (0.253) 
Pupil-teacher ratio    0.196**         (0.060)  -0.058**            (0.019) 
% Black students (ln)   -0.072             (0.109)   0.025                (0.038) 
% subsidized lunch   -0.253***       (0.030)   0.003                (0.008) 
Per pupil expenditures (in $100s): 
Instruction 
 
  -0.115             (0.117) 
 
 -0.005                (0.026) 
Instructional support    0.050             (0.812)  -0.160                (0.132) 
Instructional staff support   -0.027             (0.433)   0.046                (0.113) 
District administration   -0.519             (0.406)   0.116                (0.074) 
School administration   -0.402             (0.763)      0.014                (0.142) 
Central office support   -0.504             (0.906)  -0.161                (0.132) 






The main thing to be gleaned from the first column of coefficients is that none of 
the expenditure streams is significantly associated with the baseline AI score.  These 
results bolster many previous studies that found little association between spending levels 
and the level of educational achievement between schools.  In this regard, one 
contribution of the present study is to show that even when expenditures are broken down 
into different categories, there is no support for the contention that money matters.   
A shortcoming of many previous studies has been that their examination of the 
association between expenditure and educational achievement was static; they did not 
examine gains over time.  The second column of coefficients in Table 3, then, presents 
the effects of expenditure streams and the other factors on the mean annual gain in school 
performance.  The intercept in the second column (i.e., the slope of the annual change) 
estimates a mean annual rate of improvement of 1.89 for elementary schools.  Middle 
schools and high schools improve at significantly lesser rates, whereas combined schools 
annual gain is statistically indistinguishable from the elementary school rate.  Schools 
located in larger districts were found to have significantly greater gains, but location 
inside an MSA does not significantly affect annual gain.  Per capita income exerts a 
statistically significant negative effect.  This suggests that when school districts face 
higher costs of providing educational services, schools may be negatively impacted by 
having fewer resources with which to improve.6  Large schools show a significant 
tendency to gain at a lesser rate than small schools.  Of the remaining non-expenditure 
factors, only the pupil-teacher ratio registers a significant association with the mean 
                                                 
6 Regression to the mean could also explain this negative association between the per capita income and the 





annual gain, and the effect is negative.  An increase in the pupil-teacher ratio of one 
predicts a 0.06 decline in the mean annual gain. 
 None of the expenditure streams registers even a marginally significant direct 
effect on the mean annual gain.  In fact, taken altogether, the expenditures streams 
explain only 3.2 percent of the gain variance.  Clearly, the direct effect of all expenditures 
on school improvement is quite small.  These results are disappointing to say the least.  
Schools districts have little ability to influence the improvement of schools by shifting 
financial resources among the different expenditure categories used for this analysis.  
 As stated previously, the pupil-teacher ratio is observed to have a small, yet 
significant, negative influence on the mean annual gain.  This finding creates the 
opportunity to explore the potential indirect effects of expenditure streams on the annual 
gain when the pupil-teacher ratio is the intermediate factor.  The rationale for exploring 
these indirect effects rests upon earlier studies that were described previously 
(Wenglinsky, 1997; Grissmer et al., 2000; Pan et al., 2003).  Therefore, a second HLM 
analysis was deviseda two-level model this time.  Level 1 is this analysis consists of 
the dependent variable, the pupil-teacher ratio, and the school type dummies as control 
variables.  Level 2 is comprised of the expenditure stream variables plus per capita 
income, another control variable (see Table 4). 
 The intercept estimates the average pupil-teacher ratio for elementary schools to 
be 22.5.  Middle schools, high schools, and combined schools have substantially lower 
pupil-teacher ratios, despite the fact that elementary schools by law must have smaller 
class sizes.  The explanation of this seeming anomaly is that secondary schools have 













Table 4.  Results of the Two-Level HLM Analysis: The Effects  
   of Per Pupil Expenditure Streams on the Pupil-Teacher  
   Ratio, Controlling for Per Capita Income and School  
   Type. 
 
 
Fixed Effect          Pupil-Teacher Ratio 
        Coefficient            SE 
Intercept         22.513***        (0.282) 
Per capita income (ln)           1.839*            (0.867) 
Middle school          -7.102***        (0.304) 
High school          -6.474***        (0.362) 
Combined school          -4.867***        (0.375) 
Per pupil expenditures (in $100s): 
Instruction 
 
         -0.177***        (0.047) 
Instructional support          -0.283              (0.308) 
Instructional staff support          -0.472*            (0.182) 
District administration           0.037              (0.133) 
School administration          -0.363              (0.359)      
Central office support           1.011**          (0.349) 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p< .001 (two-tailed tests with robust standard 









analysis also reveals that high-income school districts have higher pupil-teacher ratios in 
their schools than low-income districts, as the economic theory of human capital markets 
predicts.  When the cost of human capital (i.e., per capita income) is high, the school 
district has a difficult time competing with other employers for qualified personnel 
(McMahon, 1996).   
 Three expenditure streams were discovered to be significantly associated with the 
pupil-teacher ratio.  A one standard deviation increase in the expenditure for instruction 
reduces the ratio 0.65.  When instructional staff support is increased by one standard 
deviation, the pupil-teacher ratio is reduced 0.48.  Central office support expenditure, 
unlike the previous expenditure streams, has a positive effect on the pupil-teacher ratio.  
A one standard deviation increase in the central office support expenditure is estimated to 
increase the pupil-teacher ratio 0.53.   
Coupling these findings with the effect of the pupil-teacher ratio on the mean 
annual gain (Table 3) yields the indirect effects listed below:7   
                               -0.177                                 -0.058 
    Instruction → Pupil-teacher ratio → Mean annual gain 
 
                                  -0.472                                 -0.058 
Instructional → Pupil-teacher ratio → Mean annual gain 
    staff support 
 
                         +1.011                                 -0.058 
             Central → Pupil-teacher ratio → Mean annual gain 
                 office  
                 support 
 
The expenditures for instruction and instructional staff support exercise a positive 
indirect influence.  For example, if instruction expenditure were raised one standard 





gain 0.04.  By comparison, if instructional staff support expenditure were increased by 
one standard deviation (i.e., $102 per pupil), the annual gain would increase 0.03.  
Finally, if the expenditure for central office support were decreased by one standard 
deviation (i.e., $52), the indirect effect on the annual gain would be reduced 0.03.   Since 
the effect of expenditure on central office support is negative, one can easily envision a 
tradeoff where the savings from restricting central office expenditure could be allocated 
to enhance instruction and instructional staff support.  If reallocating these financial 
resources were devoted to reducing the pupil-teacher ratio, an increase in the rate of 
improvement of schools accountability scores would be expected.  However, even in 
combination, the effects on the mean annual gain are very small.  The total effect of 
making the hypothetical changes that were sketched above in the three expenditure 
streams would raise AI scores 0.04 per year, or a total of 0.44 by 2014! 
Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that the allocations of expenditures for varying 
purposes can indirectly influence the rate of gain in school accountability scores, but 
probably not sufficiently to attract the interest of state policymakers and school districts.  
The multilevel models contained a substantial number of variables that measured 
characteristics of schools and school districts.  The pupil-teacher ratio was one of the few 
variables to register a significant association with the annual gain, although the effect size 
was small.  The model predicted that a reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio of one would 
bring about a 0.06 increase in the accountability score; a reduction of five would bring 
about a 0.30 increase.  The costs of implementing a strategy of reducing the pupil-teacher 
                                                                                                                                                 





ratio across all low improving schools in the state would be huge since it would probably 
require an increase in salaries to attract many more teachers into the field. 
The many non-significant expenditure stream effects found in this study could be 
due to the design of the multilevel analysis.  Since expenditures were measured at the 
district level while the Accountability Index score and the mean annual gain were 
measured at the school level, the effects of the expenditure streams were averaged across 
the schools within each district.  If data were available for school-level expenditures, it 
might be possible to identify a greater number of significant expenditure effects, and the 
estimations would almost certainly be more precise.  But the collection of school-level 
data in Kentucky as in other states poses grave difficulties because of variation in 
budgeting practices both within districts and between districts.  Still, assembling school-
level data should be one way to better find out how expenditures affect school 
accountability scores. 
A possible shortcoming of the present study is that it used single-year measures of 
expenditure streams but did not consider changes in expenditure over a period of years.  
Pan et al. (2003) examined five-year expenditure changes and related these to school 
district improvement during a subsequent three-year period.  However, the results were 
nonsignificant in the large majority of the tests that were performed. 
The present study used somewhat different data and a different methodology than 
a recent study by Roeder (2002), but the conclusions are similar.  Roeder used multi-year 
data to explore if teaching and financial resources moderated the negative effects of 
poverty on school district accountability scores in Kentucky.  He did not examine the 





results.  Thus, his results are comparable to the first column of regression coefficients in 
Table 2 above.8  Roeder found poverty to be the largest and most consistent factor 
affecting district performance.  Teacher quality (measured by years of experience and 
education level) had significant, positive effects in two out of five years; the effect was 
marginally significant in the remaining three years.  Teacher salary was not significant in 
any year.  Total per pupil revenue, his main measure of district financial resources, was 
not significant in any year.  These and other findings led Roeder to conclude that 
Kentucky policymakers should exercise caution when considering presumed linkages 
between resources and school performance. 
Taken together, the present investigation and Roeders do not lend much support 
to the contention that money matters.  Although Roeder reveals that teacher quality can 
make a difference, and this study suggests that reducing the pupil-teacher ratio is money 
well spent, neither effect is strong enough to support a policy recommendation, especially 
during the current period of severe state budget deficits and curtailed financing.   
Even more perplexing, neither Roeders nor this study can provide an explanation 
for the extremely weak association between spending and improving educational quality.  
Do the results of these studies really mean that how Kentucky school districts allocate 
their financial resources does not matter very much, or do they mean that school systems 
do not use money wisely to purchase high-quality resources and the most appropriate 
resources?  Perhaps the results only mean school systems are unable to assess the quality 
of the resources that they purchase.  This is probably most true of human capital 
resources (since guidelines do exist for the purchase of equipment).  For example, at the 
time of initial hiring, it may be very difficult to predict how well a teacher will perform 
                                                 





after five or ten years.  Furthermore, teachers salaries and promotions are tied to 
seniority, professional development, and degrees earnednot to the demonstrated ability 
to enhance student performance.  Since 75-80 percent of public school expenditures are 
for human capital resources (David Barnett, personal communication; McMahon, 1996), 
it seems axiomatic that efficient school finance policy cannot be achieved absent a 
reliable means for recognizing and compensating the quality of school district and school 
personnel.9 
Efforts to more effectively measure personnel quality and to establish salary rates 
commensurate with the degrees of quality could possibly lead to more robust associations 
between how money is spent and educational performance.  Yet, one cannot place 
confidence in this solution at the present time since research has not established that 
endogenous resources, including personnel quality, are the primary requisites for school 
improvement.  Exogenous circumstances, such as the characteristics of the local 
community in which the school is embedded and of the families whose children attend 
the school, along with school-community and school-family relations, may greatly 
influence how rapidly schools improve (Bryk and Schneider, 2002).   
Two other recent studies, while not conducted in Kentucky, are relevant to the 
general issue of monetary influences on school performance.  Elliott (1998) evaluates the 
process through which financial resources affect opportunities to learn in U.S. public high 
schools.  After adjusting for cost differences, she finds that per pupil expenditures 
indirectly increase achievement by giving students access to teachers with better  
                                                 
9 Measuring teacher quality has always been a difficult and controversial issue.  A recent methodology rates 
teachers by their students performance in the next three years of school (Sanders and Horn, 1994, 1998).  





credentials and teachers who use more effective pedagogies.  While these findings are a 
welcome contribution, the effect sizes are very small (one percent or less).  Condron and 
Roscigno (2003) confine their study to elementary schools in a single urban public school 
district.  Their main focus is to find out how variation in spending that is related to the 
racial and class composition of the schools affects academic achievement.  They examine 
two categories of per pupil spendinginstruction and operations/maintenance.  They also 
consider the indirect effects these forms of expenditure have on academic achievement 
through several intermediate factorsphysical condition of the school, order/consistency 
in the school, and teachers education.  The findings generally confirm their expectations.  
Spending levels are related to the racial and class composition of the schools in the 
district where their study was carried out, and both categories of spending have direct as 
well as indirect effects on school performance.  The effect sizes obtained by Condron and 
Roscigno are larger than in other research.  (Partly, this is an artifact of the small sample 
size89 schools).  For instance, they find a significant direct effect between instructional 
expenditure and school math performance as follows:  one standard deviation increase in 
per pupil instructional expenditure excluding Title I allocation (i.e., $580) is associated 
with 0.3 standard deviation increase in the schools math score.  And there are other 
direct effects for instructional expenditure of similar magnitude.10  This study suggests 
that if school-level expenditure data were to become more systematically available, the 
ability to diagnose expenditure effects could improve. 
                                                 
10 A factor that could have influenced Condron and Roscignos results to an undetermined degree is the 
maldistribution of teachers, which Rothstein (2000) states is the most serious cause of inequality within 
urban school districts.  Schools characterized by low-income students and racial minorities often are 
compelled by circumstances to hire the least experienced and least qualified teachers, while the more 
experienced and qualified teachers exercise seniority privileges to transfer from these less desirable low-





Conclusions and Implications 
 The main contributions of this study to answering the does money matter? 
question are:  (1) the measurement of various expenditure streamsin lieu of a global 
measure of educational expenditureand (2) the examination of school improvement 
through timein lieu of a static, cross-sectional analysis of school performance.  
Although the present study supports many earlier findings (Wenglinsky, 1977; Grissmer 
et al., 2000; and Pan et al., 2003), it also reveals that the direct and indirect effects of the 
expenditure streams are extremely weaktoo weak, in fact, to advise school districts on 
how to improve schools by reallocating funds.  Unless and until school-level spending 
data is systematically collected and potent linkages are established between purchasable 
inputs and student academic improvement, little guidance can be offered to school 
districts wanting to maximize the academic returns to their spending.   
In conclusion, the implications of present study may be summarized in the 
following five points: 
1. The answer to the does money matter? question remains moot for Kentucky as 
it does for the nation at large.   
2. In the present study, the direct and indirect effects of expenditure streams on the 
mean annual gain in the Accountability Index are nil, or at most very small.  
School districts are not advised to use these results to inform a strategy for 
reallocating expenditures in order to increase school accountability scores.   
3. The effects obtained in this study have been averaged because expenditures 
were measured at the district level, whereas the Accountability Index scores were 





expenditures were also measured at the school level.  Conceivably, school-level 
data would also permit greater specificity in the definition of types of expenditure.  
If this resulted in the discovery of robust links between school-level expenditures 
and school improvement, practical recommendations for spending strategies that 
optimize improvement could be forthcoming.   
4. Future studies of expenditure streams in Kentucky school systems should examine 
changes in expenditure over time as well as single-year variation in expenditure 
levels across districts.  The present study explored the latter option only. 
5. One reason why money does not seem to matter very much could be that school 
districts cannot evaluate the quality of the resources and personnel that they 
purchase.  Thus, a disconnect exists between expenditures, the quality of inputs 
that are purchased, and school performance, which shows up in studies like the 
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